Human rights and community work. Complementary theories and practices by Ife, Jim & Fiske, Lucy
HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY WORK. Complementary 
theories and practices. 
 
Jim Ife and Lucy Fiske 
 
Abstract: 
Much effort has been placed on developing international understandings of human 
rights without the corresponding attention to responsibilities. The authors argue that 
a community development framework may be useful in re-conceiving human rights in 
a more holistic way, and that social workers and community development workers 
are well placed to be ‘grass roots human rights workers’. 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between rights and responsibilities should be uncontroversial. It is 
clear that rights only make sense if there are corresponding responsibilities on others 
to protect, secure or realise those rights, and similarly responsibilities make no sense 
unless they are linked to rights; they only arise because some individual or group has 
a rights claim. Rights and responsibilities belong together, and neither can be 
adequately discussed without reference to the other. Ideological and other factors, 
however, have hindered the making of this link. The ideological divide between ‘the 
West’ (lead by the United States of America) and ‘the East’ (the Soviet Bloc) was 
central in bringing about two Covenants on human rights: the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (with its emphasis on ‘freedoms’ was acceptable to the 
liberal democracies of the West) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (with less emphasis on freedom and more on ‘provision’ and 
distribution of resources was more palatable to the socialist republics of the East).  
 
Considerable energy has been put into articulating human rights over the last 55 years 
at least; rights have been argued, discussed and debated vigorously. Comparatively 
less energy has been spent on defining human responsibilities. The world has a 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights but no corresponding Universal Declaration 
of Human Responsibilities. Responsibilities for human rights have tended to be left 
largely in a legal paradigm or to ‘the government’. Conversely, human rights are 
articulated in a much more personal (and individual) language and so it is more 
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common to hear discussions about rights rather than rights and responsibilities 
together. Rights and responsibilities are expressed in quite different languages. It is 
the contention of the authors of this paper that rights and responsibilities need to be 
part of the same discourse and that to miss either one is to engage in an incomplete 
conversation. The second half of the paper will explore ideological and theoretical 
similarities and differences between human rights and community development, 
arguing that the two discourses can complement each other and, when used together 
provide a powerful moral, theoretical and practical framework. 
 
Linking Rights and Responsibilities: Individually and Collectively 
The linking of rights to responsibilities or obligations implies the action/practice 
component of human rights. It is not enough simply to claim a right, there also needs 
to be an allocation of responsibility on others to act accordingly. Responsibilities, 
indeed, are currently the more difficult and contentious side of human rights work. It 
is relatively easy to claim a right, and to reach a consensus on that right and its 
significance. It is another thing, however, to agree on who is responsible for the 
protection of that right (in the case of a negative right), or for the realisation of that 
right in the case of a positive right (Symonides: 2000). But specifying and insisting 
on human responsibilities is a natural consequence of human rights work, and perhaps 
such work should be called human responsibilities work.  
 
Because the modern human rights regime was put into place in the context of the 
United Nations, the absence of a clear statement of human responsibilities meant that 
the responsibility for human rights was tacitly assumed to be located with the nation 
states, the members of the UN. This is reflected in the various UN instruments, 
designed to hold states accountable for the protection and realisation of human rights, 
and this has effectively devalued the role played by other actors in guaranteeing that 
human rights become a reality. These other actors include the individual, the family, 
the community, the international NGO, the corporation, and the media. Human rights 
declarations and covenants have little to say about the responsibilities of these other 
actors, yet at a time of globalisation, where the autonomy and power of the nation 
state is increasingly threatened and undermined, it becomes necessary to call these 
other actors into account if human rights are to be guaranteed. Nation states have 
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often proved to be inadequate in ensuring such responsibilities are met (Bergmann: 
2003, Haddad: 2003, Kent: 2002). 
 
In this context, it is important to emphasise that both rights and responsibilities must 
be understood both individually and collectively. Conventional western framings 
have tended to emphasise individual understandings of human rights at the expense of 
collective understandings, and in order to correct this it has become common to talk 
about “collective rights” as a separate category of rights, the so-called “third 
generation” following the first two generations of civil and political rights and 
economic social and cultural rights (again, reflecting UN definitions) (Pollis: 2000; 
Nowak: 2000). This assumption that some rights are collective while others are 
individual has been unhelpful; defining collective rights as a “third generation” leads 
to the assumption that the first two generations are therefore individual, whereas a 
more careful consideration suggests that those rights too can be understood 
collectively; for example the “first generation” rights to freedom of expression and 
protection from abuse and the “second generation” rights to education and health 
care, can be appropriately applied to groups (e.g. Indigenous People, People with 
Disabilities) as well as to individuals. Similarly so-called “collective rights”, such as 
the right to benefit from development, apply to individuals as well as to communities. 
Hence the authors propose a view that rejects a distinction between individual and 
collective rights, and instead understands all human rights as having both individual 
and collective aspects (Ife: 2001). 
 
The same applies to responsibilities. Traditionally responsibilities are conceptualised 
as a contract between the individual and the state. The individual owes the state a 
responsibility to obey the laws of that state and to give her/his exclusive loyalty to the 
state. The state has a responsibility to protect the fundamental freedoms of the 
individual and in some cases to provide certain services and conditions to enable the 
individual to realise her/his full potential (Janoski: 1998). Responsibilities for human 
rights can more usefully be understood at multiple levels of human community, from 
individual, to family, neighbourhood, community, nationally and globally. This 
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Responsibilities to one another and to the collective notion of ‘humanity’ go deeper 
and beyond those responsibilities formally codified in laws and regulations. Laws and 
regulations are essential in the construction of a human rights based society – well 
designed legal systems will ensure that governments continue to serve the people, 
rather than government itself; that corporations’ drive for ever increasing profit is 
moderated by a mandatory concern for wage levels, employment conditions and so 
on; and that some form of justice and recompense can be sought if our rights are 
violated. However, to leave responsibility for human rights exclusively, or even 
principally, with a legal system would be unsatisfactory and unsatisfying. If human 
rights are conceived of as being essentially a set of moral and ethical codes guiding 
relationships between groups and individuals, then we have responsibilities to each 
other for which ‘the law’ would be no more appropriate a tool than a hammer would 
be for driving a screw. Legal systems tend to deal with the parameters of a society or 
system, that is they determine the bounds within which we all must live, leaving 
necessary freedom for human activity within these bounds. It is in this ‘free space’ 
that most human interaction occurs and where ethics, morals and even manners are at 
play much more than laws. We listen while others speak not because it is mandatory 
that we do so, but because it is respectful towards the other person and the valuing of 
humanity and respect, guides our actions.  
 
Additionally, the process of leaving responsibilities for human rights with nation 
states and legal systems relieves us of our responsibilities and reinforces an elitist 
discourse of rights – suggesting that one needs specialist qualifications, and that one 
needs to be an ‘expert’ to engage in human rights work. Those of us without the 
necessary qualifications are then rendered as powerless in the human rights field. 
Alternately, it may lead us as human rights workers and activists into an overly 
legalistic focus, where the object of the campaign is legislative change and so when, 
for example, anti-racism laws are passed, there is the danger that many people feel a 
(well deserved) sense of achievement and think that the job is done. Whereas in 
actual fact, anti-racist legislation alone will not eradicate racism. Is it widely accepted 
that racism works in far more institutionalised and insidious ways to be eradicated by 
laws. Community based education, consciousness raising campaigns and ongoing 
movements at every level of society are needed to change public sentiment and 
values. Finally, it casts us as human beings in a passive role; that of consumers, and 
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human rights as a product or service – a model that people in the modern West are 
well groomed to accept. 
 
Recasting human rights and responsibilities at a community level and on a human 
scale re-asserts human expertise in shared humanity and reclaims the power that lies 
in both rights and responsibilities at the local level. 
 
The linking of human rights and human responsibilities emphasises an interactive 
component of human rights. It is not only the idea of the right, but the imperative to 
act on the corresponding responsibility that gives human rights their power as a 
framework for social work practice. Rights cannot exist in individual isolation; a 
person alone on a desert island has no rights, simply because there is nobody else to 
accept and act on the corresponding responsibilities. Rights only exist when there are 
people in interaction, where rights and responsibilities are collectively realised, and 
are acted out. In this sense, it is meaningless to talk about “my rights”, and far more 
useful to talk about “our rights”. This suggests that rights only make sense within 
community. They require a community of interlocking rights and responsibilities 
which people accept as members of a group, be it a family, a community or a nation. 
From such a position, one can argue that there is an element of collectivism 
associated with the idea of human rights. Human rights are incompatible with an 
extreme individualism which maintains along with Mrs Thatcher and the neo-
conservatives that ‘there is no such thing as society’, only individuals acting in self-
interest Thatcher: 1987). Rather, human rights lead to a recognition of our need for 
collective structures of some sort so that human rights can be protected and realised, 
or in the words of the American philosopher Alan Gewirth, the community of rights 
(Gewirth: 1996). It is this necessary connection between human rights and 
community that will be explored in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Localising universal rights 
Conventions and declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the various treaty bodies of the UN are an important common reference point and 
international ‘standard’, but as postulated earlier, a robust and pluralistic system of 
human rights requires active participation from below. Global human rights call upon 
the UN, nation states and communities to engage in the promotion and protection of 
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human rights. For many people, the UN will remain something that they are vaguely 
pleased exists, but an institution with which few in the West will have direct contact. 
For most people around the world human rights are experienced in the local context – 
both in their realisation and violation. Human rights are based upon a belief in our 
common humanity, the principle of universality – that we all share the same rights 
and responsibilities regardless of differences of culture, religion, gender, ability, 
nationality and so on (Nagengast: 1998). For several years there has been an ongoing 
debate about universality and relativity. Universality has been criticised as enforcing 
a model of humanity and human rights centred on a Western philosophy of the 
individual on people from cultures where a collective understanding of humanity is 
primary to the individual notion. As with most arguments there is some validity in the 
argument, the authors however, argue that universality does not mean ‘sameness’, 
rather it is a principle that emphasises the essential worth of every human being 
without the need to reach a certain status or fit a certain model of ‘desirable citizen’. 
Universality enshrines this core value for all human beings whilst allowing for (and 
we would argue, encouraging) diversity of culture, religion, gender, sexuality and so 
on. (Much has been written on this and readers interested in pursuing this further are 
directed to Bell L.S., Nathan A.J. & Peleg, I. (eds) (2001) Negotiating Culture and 
Human Rights or any other of a range of texts addressing the issue). 
 
Moral humanity 
This notion of common humanity is an important one to explore, for it exposes the 
serious limitations of restricting human rights discourse to a concept of the 
autonomous individual. Raymond Gaita, in his book A Common Humanity, states that 
‘If “human being” meant only homo sapiens, then the term could play no interesting 
moral role’ (Gaita 1999: 263). The essence of humanity does not arise from, and goes 
well beyond mere biology. Science has indeed established common genetic traits of 
human beings, but human rights are not so much concerned with the individual and 
shared biology of the human species, it is in moral life; in social, political, cultural 
and spiritual life that people realise their humanity, and this aspect of human life and 
human endeavour occurs in community, in relationship with others (Arrendt: 1958, 
Arrendt cited in Haddad: 2003: 20). 
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Taking a moral philosophical approach to human rights may initially appear too 
abstract to be of much use, but as an example one can look at what this means for 
reconciliation in present day Australia. The Howard government has refused to offer 
an apology or any form of spiritual or moral healing for the injustices and human 
rights violations of colonisation. Howard’s ‘practical reconciliation’ focusing on 
service delivery, outcomes and benchmarks to the exclusion of a moral/spiritual 
reconciliation denies the suffering of Aboriginal Australians and in doing so, denies 
their shared humanity (our common/universal humanity) and so will never achieve 
human rights for Indigenous Australians or reconciliation for all Australians. In 
denying our common humanity Howard entrenches the divide between Indigenous 
and colonial Australians. Human rights work must keep the essence of humanity 
central, and the essence of humanity lies not only in the individual but, as social 
workers have argued for years, in the person-in-relationship. 
 
Bertman (2004) emphasises this universality of humanity and the human endeavour 
observing that “this moral primacy (of human relationships) is a matter of personhood 
rather than personality” (Bertman: 2004: 90). This holds up an anthropological rather 
than a psychological lens through which to explore our humanity. This shift in 
perspective takes us some way towards freeing us from the Western rationalist, 
scientific focus on the individual and instead emphasises the communal. 
 
Theoretical links between human rights and community work 
In this context human rights become not so much a claim made by an individual or 
individuals, but a process and a structure for human community. From this 
perspective all humans share a moral order and are subject to moral law (Parel: 1997, 
Gandhi: 1927). Human rights then, are collectively constructed, collectively 
understood and collectively experienced. I cannot have ‘my’ rights if you do not have 
‘yours’, and hence they become “our rights”. This collective ownership and 
experience of human rights, locating rights in the experience of human community, 
suggests that community development work and human rights work have much in 
common. Human rights and community work share many principles and their 
ideologies overlap considerably. Both, for example, insist upon locating humanity at 
the core of their activity, both aspire to improve human well-being, value self-
determination, discuss both rights and responsibilities, and carry a vision of a ‘better 
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world’ at both the global (universal) and local (specific) levels. There are also some 
important differences between the two disciplines which will be explored shortly, and 
it is here that the authors believe that the human rights and community work can 
complement and strengthen each other. 
Much human rights literature separates human rights into the ‘three generations’ 
(civil and political rights are categorised as 1st generation rights; economic, social and 
cultural rights are termed 2nd generation rights; while 3rd generation rights are 
collective rights) (Donnelly: 2003). While this model can be a useful framework for 
thinking about human rights it can also be problematic. It can be argued for example, 
that “economic, social and cultural” rights are conceptually distinct and can be better 
explored and understood if they are in separate categories (Ife: 2003). In Ife (2003) 
we have argued that there should also be a special category of survival rights, namely 
rights to very basic things needed to keep us alive: food, clothing, shelter, health care. 
In the three generations model, these are regarded as part of “social rights”, but 
should not be confused with other social rights relating to families, marriage, children 
etc. It is the authors’ contention that environmental rights and spiritual rights both 
tend to be significantly undervalued in traditional human rights discourse, but are 
sufficiently important as to be separate categories. This leads to a classification of 
human rights into seven categories: survival, civil/political, cultural, economic, social, 
environmental and spiritual. These are similar to the dimensions of community 
development present in much community development literature. Ife (2002) identifies 
6 categories of community development: social, cultural, political, economic, 
personal/spiritual, and environmental. As people from a community development 
background who have moved into human rights work, we have found the theoretical 
convergence of the two quite remarkable. This is evident in both theory and practice. 
There are many skills of the community worker (facilitation, assisting communities to 
be more self-determining, writing funding submissions, education skills, advocacy 
and so on) that are not at all alien to the human rights worker though the terminology 
may differ slightly. 
 
An important difference between human rights work and community development 
work is that community work has a bottom-up approach built in as a core value and 
central guiding principle. Community work is explicit in its agenda of giving primacy 
to the wisdom of the grass roots level ahead of the external expert’s. Human rights, or 
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at least as it is given expression in UN structures and systems has no such directive 
built in. While many UN programs certainly seek to empower communities and 
improve life experiences at the local level, the actual structure of the UN itself runs 
directly counter to this. The UN has a highly centralised hierarchal structure, complex 
treaties, conventions, committees, councils and so on. Most people who may wish to 
directly engage the protective systems of the UN need a professional intermediary to 
guide them through. To use the UN one needs to speak one of the major languages, 
has access to fax or email, understand the committee structures and preferably be able 
to go to New York or Geneva to lobby for their cause. This is not an organisation 
built on principles of grass roots community development.   
 
The strength of community work’s commitment to bottom-up work is that its 
structures are designed to recognise and redress existing structural oppression. The 
bottom up approach encourages analysis along class, race and gender lines. Top down 
development can all too often be the imposition of development programs designed 
by the powerful and privileged on the powerless and unprivileged. In a class analysis 
economic power and privilege are the focus of critique, whereas in a feminist analysis 
patriarchal structures of power and privilege are highlighted. A bottom up approach 
insists that the worker(s) look for intersectional disadvantage and are proactive about 
addressing inequalities within communities. Without this structural analysis there is 
the risk of developing for example, strong workers unions that primarily address the 
concerns of working class men without due regard to women’s employment 
conditions, or women’s rights movements comfortable for middle class white women 
but inaccessible to migrant or refugee women. A top down approach to human rights 
would focus on the UN, treaties, conventions, negotiations with heads of state and so 
on, where human rights are defined by opinion leaders, politicians, media, laws or 
other dominant discourses, whereas bottom-up approaches are where people are 
involved in constructing ideas of human rights for themselves, and where human 
rights emerge from everyday lived experience (Kenny: 1999, Kelly & Sewell: 1998). 
 
Another dimension is that of working “from outside” or “from inside”. In community 
work, this can be referred to as external and internal community work, which are 
often equated with “from above” and “from below”, but for analytical purposes it is 
important to separate these. Community development that is from within the 
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community itself can still be from above, where that development is initiated and 
controlled by community elites, potentially working in the interests of those elites 
rather than the community as a whole. Similarly, community development may be 
initiated externally, but can be “from below”, examples being the programs of 
international NGOs, or community workers coming from outside the community but 
using a specifically Gandhian perspective of working with the poorest of the poor 
(Kenny: 1999, Kelly & Sewell: 1998). The two dimensions are therefore different. 
Working from above risks reinforcing class oppression, while working from outside 
risks colonialist practice (Popple: 1995). With human rights, the “inside/outside” 
distinction might be called the colonial/indigenous dimension, which has long been 
important in human rights literature, and expresses the debate and conflict over 
cultural relativism and the imposition of human rights standards from outside, usually 
from Western Enlightenment perspectives which do not always resonate with other 
cultural and intellectual traditions (Donnelly: 2003). 
 
The similarity of human rights and community development, across these two 
dimensions, can be seen in the following tables, which combine the two dimensions 




These dimensions, then, have relevance for both human rights and community 
development, and represent an important opportunity for the two paradigms to 
converge at both a theoretical and practice level. A community development 
paradigm has many strengths including the need to be locally active, to value the 
wisdom of ordinary people and to see the wisdom in local communities’ processes. 
Communities remain the location where most of us will have most of our life 
experiences (both good and bad). Human rights discourses could be strengthened by 
community work’s bottom up, anti-colonial practice. Similarly, community workers 
need to be careful that in strengthening a particular community they are not 
contributing to the oppression or exclusion of people beyond their immediate vision, 
and a human rights approach offers a clear, comprehensive and practical framework 
for guiding one’s practice.  
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The links between community development and human rights could be explored 
further, but the point of this paper has been simply to emphasise the commonalities 
between the two. Indeed, it might be claimed that community development needs a 
human rights framework if it is to be successful, and human rights need a community 
development framework if they are to be realised. 
 
This suggests that social workers, with their understanding of human community and 
community development, are potentially important human rights workers and have 
much to contribute to the field of human rights. In addition, human rights can be seen 
as a valid values framework for community development work. As most people 
experience human rights in the local context, an environment in which social workers 
are very active and familiar, the familiar activity of day-to-day community work can 
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